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Abstract 
Politics change, so does public administration.  The aim of this research is to evaluate the 
Build Operate Transfer (BOT) – based policy in the modernization of Dinoyo Traditional Mar-
ket Malang city, East Java province, Indonesia.  The research was conducted during 2017-
2018.  The research was based on a qualitative research design, and used in-depth interview, 
observation and documentation to collect data. Research results showed that the change in In-
donesian political landscape that begin with the  step down of President Soeharto from  office  
in May 1998, also served as a  milestone of radical change in public administration. The 
change in politics from authoritarianism towards democracy, also affected the way government 
is organized and the delivery of public services are delivered from an over centralized to a de-
centralized approach. The BOT scheme in the public service delivery, is a public private part-
nership arrangement, which is a new alternative available to deliver public services.  The Di-
noyo Traditional Market,   which was developed by the central government in 1980s, has since 
been redeveloped to become a modern market that is today known as Malang City Mall. Under 
the BOT scheme, a group of private Indonesian Chinese investors financed the reconstruction 
of the market, and have the opportunity to operate the mall for a certain period, after which 
ownership will revert to the city government. Some of the adverse effects of BOT arrangement 
include decline in income of small traditional traders due to the loss of space to carry out their 
activities, marginalization of traditional tenants as their products are replaced by domestically 
manufactured and imported goods, caused disputes due to the feeling of unfairness.   
 
Keywords: built operate transfer (BOT), conflicts, good governance, modernization, political 
economy of development, traditional market 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a symbiosis between rural 
and urban areas. Rural areas supply basic 
needs such as rice, vegetables and fruits, 
which   urban dwellers buy to meet their 
basic needs while generating income for the 
former (Hlaing, Kamiyama, & Saito, 2017). 
Meanwhile, urban dwellers provide services, 
including education, medical services and 
manufactured products, which rural dwellers 
buy (Satterthwaite, McGranahan, & Tacoli, 
2010).Thus, relations between urban and 
rural areas are mutual in nature, hence inter-
dependent.   One manifestation of interde-
pendence between rural and urban areas is 
the existence of traditional markets (Castle, 
Wu, & Weber, 2011). Usually located in 
strategic parts of the city, traditional markets 
gave served various roles for society, includ-
ing meeting places, buying and selling mer-
chandise, and sharing and exchange between 
urban and rural cultures. Nonetheless, tradi-
tional markets despite offering a variety of 
merchandise from rural areas to urban resi-
dents at affordable prices face an existential 
threat posed by modern markets who are 
better organized, managed, have better facil-
ities, good sanitation, safety and security. It 
is in order to redress this problem that the 
Indonesian government since 1980s imple-
mented traditional market revitalization poli-
cy, that continues to this day  (Gunawan, 
2018). Dinoyo traditional market is one of 
thousands traditional markets were affected 
by the revitalization program (Alamsyah, 
2017).  
 Nonetheless, the management of the 
revitalization process right from bidding to 
execution, has come in for criticism, from 
some stakeholders who dissatisfied with the 
mechanisms used in the process. The objec-
tive of this research is to assess the impact 
of using BOT mechanism in revitalizing Di-
noyo traditional market on relations among 
the three key stakeholders in the project, in-
ter alia, traditional market tenants, private 
investors, and Malang city government. 
Traditional markets, sell products 
that are produced in rural areas to urban resi-
dents, serve as space for transactions and 
exchange between rural and urban dwellers, 
hence are essential for the survival and sus-
tainability of residents in rural and urban 
areas. The New Order Regime, under Presi-
dent Suharto issued a presidential instruction 
that provided the legal foundation for the 
establishment of thousands of traditional 
markets during the 1980s in many urban are-
as in Indonesia. For that reason, traditional 
markets are also referred to as Inpres or 
presidential instruction Number 7 of 1982 
about Market Development and CrreditsAs-
sistance. Physically, traditional markets have 
simple structures that are characterized by 
open spaces traditional sellers display their 
produce and merchandize that are easily ac-
cessible to buyers (Sasanto & Yusuf, 2010). 
However, in general, traditional markets oc-
cupy strategic locations on state owned land. 
In relation to the management, most, if not 
all, of traditional markets have been put un-
der the control of local governments  
Another important characteristic of 
traditional markets is the priority they ac-
cord to small tenants, who are usually resi-
dents of the surrounding areas. Thus, traders 
with a lot of capital are not allowed to oper-
ate stalls in traditional markets. A thorough 
observation on the regular market activities 
have shown that based on the above man-
agement and ownership of stalls model, tra-
ditional markets have been successful in 
serving as a meeting place for traditional 
sellers and the lower income urban buyers 
(Aulawi, 2015)  . 
Traditional markets serve broadly 
two sets of customers. Some customers are 
attracted by cheap prices offered in tradi-
tional markets for basic necessities while 
another set of customers comprises those 
who buy products at cheap prices in tradi-
tional markets for reselling to high end cus-
tomers near their residences and in modern 
shops (Sumintarsih, 2011).  However, the 
performance of traditional markets has been 
bedeviled by poor management, disor-
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ganized display of products in stalls, low 
hygiene, danger to the personal and property 
safety (pickpockets being a common prob-
lem) and product price fluctuations, and gen-
erally marginal incomes for tenants due to 
small margins. Thus, unlike modern markets 
such as Indomart, Alfamart, Giant and Hy-
permart, sellers and buyers of products in 
traditional markets face uncertainty of both 
product price and quality. Consequently, 
while some traditional tenants continued to 
sell their produce at increasingly low profit 
margins, the number of customers visiting 
traditional markets declined over time large-
ly due to personal safety and health concerns 
(Rahayuningrum & Tjahya, n.d.). 
To address the problem of decreasing 
public interest in traditional markets, succes-
sive reformative era governments embarked 
on measures to modernize them to make 
them more welcoming and attractive to cus-
tomers. Based on Minister of Trade regula-
tion No. 37/M-DAG/PER/5/2017, thousands 
of traditional markets are set for moderniza-
tion.  Indeed, the process of modernizing 
traditional markets has been underway even 
before the ministry of trade regulation to that 
effect was issued. The number of traditional 
markets which have been claimed to be 
modernized between 2015 to 2018 is 4.211 
dispersed throughout 34 provinces. Accord-
ingly, there still 1.037 markets to be finished 
in 2019 or are set for modernization in the 
future (Kominfo,2019.) Based on the Minis-
ter of trade regulation, Malang municipality 
has initiated plans to modernize traditional 
markets in the City, one of which is the 
Pasar Inpres Dinoyo. To support the mod-
ernization process, the municipal govern-
ment issued local regulation No. 12/ 2004 as 
the legal framework. 
Dinoyo City Mall is an epitome of a 
modernized traditional market.  In line with 
changes in national and local politics and 
public administration, which have led to the 
increasing involvement of the private sector, 
civil society, and the public in the delivery 
of services, the modernization of Dinoyo 
Traditional Market,  which is based on the 
Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) public 
and private sector arrangement. The project 
was entrusted to private investors.  In other 
words, the redevelopment of Dinoyo tradi-
tional market, was not tailored toward em-
powering traditional tenants rather driven by 
investment cost and return considerations for 
investors who bankrolled the modernization 
of the project.  
Consequently, modernization of Di-
noyo traditional market has fundamentally 
changed the function and relations among 
various stakeholders. The involvement of 
private sectors, especially Indonesian Chi-
nese, in the modernization process, has sig-
nificantly shifted the role and function of the 
traditional market. While traditional markets 
historically, have been reserved as locations 
where low income residents sell and buy 
basic necessities, the development of Di-
noyo traditional market to become Dinoyo 
Mall, has led to the marginalization of tradi-
tional tenants. The implication is the current 
government has abandoned the purpose of 
empowering traditional tenants which was 
conceived and implemented by the previous 
government.  
Poor implementation of good gov-
ernance principles in the management of 
traditional markets is another factor that 
caused disputes among the traditional mar-
ket tenants, the local government and mod-
ern sector practitioners. In the Dinoyo City 
Mall case, the dispute pitted between the 
Association of Traditional Traders, which 
represents Dinoyo traditional market tenants 
on one hand, and Citra Gading Asritama Ltd 
and the local government (representing Di-
noyo redevelopment investors and the City 
Mayor, respectively). It is thus apparent that 
the current city government, unlike its pre-
decessors, tends to lend support the stance 
taken by large private investors as opposed 
to that taken by traditional market tenants.  
The modernization and management 
of traditional markets is based on Presiden-
tial regulation No. 112 / 2007 on the man-
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agement and development of traditional 
markets, shopping centers, and modern 
stores and trade, and Minister of Trade regu-
lation No. 70/M-DAG/PER/12/2013 that 
stipulates the Guidelines for Planning and 
Development of Traditional Markets, Shop-
ping Centers, and Modern Stores. 
There are 7  large  traditional mar-
kets in Malang, which have been earmarked 
for modernization, inter alia,   Dinoyo mar-
ket,  Blimbing market,  Gadang market,  Oro
-Oro Dowo market,  Klojen market,  and the 
Central  Market (locates in Malang city cen-
ter). Specifically, Dinoyo market, which is 
the focus of this research, is located in 
Lowokwaru sub district, Malang city, East 
Java province. Modernization of traditional 
markets in Malang city is underpinned by 
the Malang City Mayor Regulation No. 
188.45/16/35.73.112/2010, which stipulates 
the use of Build Operate Transfer as the fi-
nancing and management mechanism for the 
construction and subsequent management of 
the market.  
In 2010, the city government sociali-
zation the project. Based on project plan, 
Dinoyo traditional market tenants were sup-
posed to be temporarily resettled to a new 
location in Merjosari village administration 
during the construction phase, and would 
return to the modernized market. However, 
considering that private investors were re-
sponsible for redeveloping the traditional 
market rather than the local government, tra-
ditional tenants initially refused the request 
to temporarily   relocate because of the fear 
that  they would find it difficult to return to 
their stalls once the completion of the mod-
ernization exercise was done.  
To that end, from the outset, modern-
ization of Dinoyo traditional market based 
on BOT model, was characterized by vested 
interests that varied by key stakeholders 
(Prastanta, 2004). Traditional market ten-
ants,  who were not involved in paying the 
cost of traditional market redevelopment 
perceived  modernization as a threat to their 
livelihoods (losing space to trade their mer-
chandize once modernization was done); 
local government, lacking sufficient re-
sources to implement central government 
policy on modernization of traditional mar-
kets, opted to use BOT mechanism with the 
consequence that the  redevelopment and 
subsequent management of the traditional 
market had to be relinquished to private in-
vestors who financed the project; private 
investors, financed the development  of the 
market, hence had vested interest in ensuring 
that tenants in the modernized market would 
be charged such rent that would enable them 
to recoup their investment cost .  
It is not therefore surprising that the 
dispute ended up pitting traditional market 
tenants on one hand, and private investors 
and local government on the other. Conse-
quently, efforts by traditional market tenants 
to stage demonstrations against the local 
government demanding more stalls in the 
modern market were futile.  Based on BOT 
arrangement, Malang city government no 
longer has the authority to influence tenants 
in the modern market, because it is vested in  
private investors (CGA  Ltd) Thus, upon 
completion of the redevelopment exercise of 
Dinoyo traditional market, many traditional 
tenants have been unable to return to their 
former stalls, let alone allocated new ones, 
which has adversely affected  incomes and 
wellbeing of their households and families. 
 
Literature Review Dual Economy and its 
Ramifications 
        Indonesia like many other emerging 
countries has characteristics of dual econo-
my. There is a traditional, rural and urban 
sector, which is fraught with economic ac-
tivities which  are informal, small scale, low 
technology adoption, managed by the use of 
traditional practices, lack access to modern 
financial system and potentially  suffer from 
low productivity (Bebbington, Dharmawan, 
Fahmi, & Guggenheim, 2006). Conditions in 
the modern sector are the converse of those 
in the traditional sector and are characterized 
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by formal, medium and large enterprises, 
high and quick adoption of technology in 
operations and management, use modern 
management practices such as book keeping, 
have easy access to financial system 
(Cowan, 1954). There is however, little rela-
tions between the traditional and modern 
sectors of the economy, which undermines 
productivity and progress of the economy as 
a whole. In other words, since both the tradi-
tional and modern sectors are an integral but 
separate components of the economy, reduc-
ing stark differences in social, economic, 
managerial, financial, and technological 
conditions, should be advantageous to both 
and the local and national economy at large 
(Susanto & Prihatminingtyas, 2016). This 
underlines the rationale for the government 
policy on revitalizing traditional markets. 
The policy of President Law Number 112 
year 2007 among other goals, aimed to em-
power traditional market tenants by improv-
ing the quality of infrastructure of the mar-
kets where they undertake their activities, 
overhaul organization of stalls to instill or-
der, improve public facilities including sani-
tation and health, parking space, safety and 
security. 
Traditional Market Revitalization   
One of the most formidable challenges 
traditional markets face is strong competi-
tion from modern markets (Minten & 
Reardon, 2008). Modern markets create an 
ambience that provides shoppers memorable 
experience that is punctuated by a lot of fun, 
good sanitation and incredible hospitality, 
have a  one-stop shopping strategy that  al-
lows an individual to not only do shopping 
but have  lunch or dinner, whilst  enjoying  
entertainment (Ibid).  
 Besides, modern markets are well 
organized, offer attractive discounts, 
trade-in opportunities, afford customer 
personal safety and price certainty 
(Arianty, 2018). To that end, unless tradi-
tional markets are revitalized, there is lit-
tle reason to believe they can survive the 
competition in the long run. Consequent-
ly, the demise of traditional markets, if it 
materializes, will not only marginalize 
small traditional market tenants whose 
income comes solely from selling mer-
chandise in the market, but will also have 
adverse effects on rural areas and popula-
tion who supply produce as well as low 
income brackets in urban areas who rely 
of such places to buy food, clothing and 
other items at cheap prices. In other 
words, the decline of the importance of 
traditional markets in the economy of ur-
ban areas, has the potential to have debili-
tating effects on incomes of low income 
earners in both rural and urban areas, 
and by extension, urban and rural econo-
my (Bebbington et al., 2006) 
  Revitalization of traditional mar-
ket can be defined as the act of synergizing 
the potential of traditional market by im-
proving competitiveness through redressing 
various obstacles that undermine operations, 
management, and performance in a compre-
hensive, integrated, and holistic manner 
(Daryanto, 2009). Revitalizing traditional 
markets is necessary for a number of rea-
sons.  Traditional markets are not competi-
tive as they strategic location would suggest, 
because of poor management, disorganiza-
tion, poor sanitation, insufficient public fa-
cilities such as parking area, hallways, and 
hardy any fun to entertain (Arianty, 2018). 
Consequently, despite cheap prices of prod-
ucts and commodities and strategic locations 
in urban areas, traditional markets continue 
to be no areas for most but a few urban resi-
dents.  
Principles of Good Governance 
        The concept of good governance owes 
its origin and popularization to the United 
Nation Development Program (UNDP). 
Since its introduction, many local and na-
tional government have emphasized the im-
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portance of adopting good governance prin-
ciples as an integral component of people 
centric delivery of public goods and services 
(Rhodes, 1996) (UNDP, 2011).  Moreover, 
good governance emphasizes good manage-
ment of public assets, which is predicated on 
the involvement of key stakeholders, inter 
alia, the state, that provides a conducive po-
litical and legal environment; ii) The private 
sector, which is involved in  various fields 
and informal sectors in the market; and iii) 
Society, which is engaged through the par-
ticipation  of  non state actors in general and 
civil society (non-governmental organiza-
tions and professional organizations) in par-
ticular in economic social, and political ac-
tivities (Indradi, 2005).  
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
The Political Economy of Dinoyo Tradi-
tional Market Revitalization 
Malang city mayor regulation No. 
188.45/16/35.73.112/2010 provided the le-
gal framework for the modernization of Di-
noyo traditional market. The regulation stip-
ulates that the Build Operate Transfer 
scheme was the mechanism used in imple-
menting and subsequently managing the 
project for the pre-determined period until it 
was to be transferred back to the Malang 
city government. Indonesian Chinese entre-
preneurs provided the funding for the con-
struction of the project, which also implied 
that they had the rights over the manage-
ment of Dinoyo market revitalization after 
its completion. To that end, by its nature, the 
BOT mechanism of revitalizing Dinoyo tra-
ditional market had the potential for disputes 
between former traditional market tenants 
on one hand, and Indonesian Chinese and 
the city government, on the other. To identi-
fy sources of disputes, several questions  can 
serve as pointers, which include, the kind of 
products that a modern market can sell,  cus-
tomers that have the purchasing power to  
buy such products, the cost of the revitalized 
market and who bears the cost of the project 
(economic and labor dynamics); the impact 
of the market revitalization on distribution 
of production and resources that are the 
market and its environment generate, who 
loses and who gains, and  the  effect  that 
such outcomes  have on relations between 
various stakeholders who have  vested inter-
est in market dynamics (political economy); 
and the level and consumer surplus revital-
ized market generates and how such surplus 
is distributed among stakeholders 
(traditional market tenants, investors of the 
revitalization process, and the city govern-
ment) (impact of market revitalization on 
development).  
             Closer observation of the contents 
of the  regulation, especially its provisions 
on the mode of financing and management 
of Dinoyo market revitalization, underscores 
the departure  of the policy direction which  
the current city government has taken from 
that pursued by the former government, 
which was in line with the spirit that under-
pins the goal of the central government in 
revitalizing traditional market-enhancing 
competitiveness of traditional market ten-
ants vis-a-vis traders and operators of mod-
ern markets. The main focus of Dinoyo mar-
ket revitalization is to increase revenues for 
the city government, which is possible 
through relinquishing the task of financing 
project construction to private investors, in 
compensation for which, future management 
of the modernized market was vested with 
investors. It is efficient taking precedence 
over empowerment  of traditional market 
tenants, which makes  disputes between tra-
ditional market tenants and other members 
of society who derived benefits from the 
existence of the traditional market one hand, 
and beneficiaries of the revitalized market 
that include private investors and Malang 
city government. 
Social and Economic Conditions 
There is stark contrast in economic, 
management and technological conditions 
that  characterized the economic activities 
that served a means of livelihood for the ma-
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jority of local indigenous population tradi-
tional market for example and that those 
where the majority of Indonesian Chinese 
population earned a living. It has been com-
mon knowledge that economic activities that 
involved Indigenous people  were small in 
scale, managed by owner operator using tra-
ditional management skills, used rudimental 
technology, if at all, financed by funds col-
lected from friends and close kin, and had 
very few limited connections and relations 
with other businesses and government (Dan 
et al., n.d.). On the contrary, agents involved 
in the  modern economy, where most Indo-
nesian Chinese earn a living and own and 
operate businesses, are capitally  intensive, 
characterized by separation between owner-
ship and management,  adopt  high technol-
ogy in operations, have easy access to the 
banking system, their connections with other 
businesses and government. In an attempt to 
reduce the stark differences in operating, 
management, financing, and technological 
conditions between traditional and modern 
markets, the Indonesian government imple-
mented the policy on revitalizing traditional 
markets in the 1980s which was famously 
called Pasar Inpres or Presidential Instructed 
Market.  The thrust of the policy lies in its 
efforts to enhance the ability of traditional 
markets to serve as bridgehead between ru-
ral production centers and urban customers  
Improving operating and management 
conditions in Dinoyo traditional market for 
instance, was expected to smoothen and 
strengthen the flow of agricultural commod-
ities such as rice fruits, vegetables as well as 
nonagricultural products produced in rural 
areas from rural areas to customers in urban 
areas. Besides, improvement in organization 
of stalls in the market, safety and security, 
availability of parking for visitors, and sani-
tation and health, were expected to increase 
the attractiveness of Dinoyo market for ur-
ban customers, which by implication would 
increase demand and supply of goods from 
rural areas.  
 
Assessing the adoption of Good Govern-
ance Principles in the Revitalization of 
Dinoyo Traditional  
Market. 
With respect to the adoption of good 
governance during the revitalization of Di-
noyo Traditional Market, several indicators 
point to absence of the same. One good indi-
cator of absence of good governance in the 
revitalization of Dinoyo traditional was the 
noninvolvement of traditional tenants in 
project planning and reconstruction. Consid-
ering the fact that the project was financed 
through BOT mechanism, the main players 
were limited to  Malang city government  as 
the regulating authority and private inves-
tors, through   CGA Ltd as the project im-
plementation entity  that The redevelopment 
plan,  based on CGA Ltd plan which was 
approved under the BOT arrangement , con-
fers upon private investors the right to man-
age the revitalized market for 30 years after 
which it will revert to Malang city govern-
ment.  There are indications, which howev-
er, have not been proved without reasonable 
doubt, that project bidding process was 
plagued by collusion between rogue Malang 
city officials and CGA Ltd. This is reflected 
in the fact that during the bidding process, 
CGA Ltd bid had 10 percent points ad-
vantage compared with other bidders. It is 
not therefor surprising that CGA was de-
clared winner of the Dinoyo reconstruction 
bid.    
It should, however, be noted that 
winning the bid did not automatically guar-
antee CGA Ltd as the company to recon-
struct the Dinoyo traditional market. This is 
because upon winning the bidding process, 
it had to be submitted to the city legislature 
for ratification.  Traditional market tenants 
used that opportunity to stage demonstra-
tions expressed their objection to the bid-
ding process and the outcome. Nonetheless, 
such opposition proved irrelevant as the city 
legislature also ratified the results of the bid-
ding process. It is not, therefore, surprising 
that some members of society allege collu-
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sion between the city government executive 
organ and legislature on one hand and CGA 
Ltd which ensured that the reconstruction of 
the traditional market and subsequent man-
agement after completion, for 30 years. 
 
The Triangular Conflict in the Dinoyo 
Market Revitalization Project 
Ideally, the implementation of Di-
noyo traditional market revitalization pro-
ject, based on BOT mechanism , should go 
smoothly if all good governance principles 
were complied with during project planning, 
bidding and implementation. The assump-
tion that using BOT in revitalizing Dinoyo 
traditional market would make necessary  
compliance with good governance principles 
with all driven by the overarching goal of 
achieving common interest, proved unfound-
ed and unrealistic. The three parties, inter 
alia, traditional market tenants, Malang city 
government, and Indonesian Chinese inves-
tors, despite having different interests, were 
expected to sidelines their group interests to 
support the common goal of improving col-
lective wellbeing through the reconstruction 
of Dinoyo traditional market. Facts on the 
ground pointed to divergence of interests 
among the three parties, as a source of irrec-
oncilable differences that created fertile 
found for protracted conflicts. 
The local government or Mayor is 
one the key three stakeholders, vested with 
authority to regulate ,administer the confer-
ring of operating permits to operators of as-
sets that belong to city government, collect 
revenue, and charged with the responsibility 
of providing public services to the citizenry 
under their remit.  Private investors, is the 
second party, which is represented CGA Ltd 
and Hyarta Danadipa Raya Ltd (HDR). Pri-
vate investors provide funds to finance the 
reconstruction of the market, and in compen-
sation, based on BOT terms, offered the 
right to manage Dinoyo revitalized market 
for 30 years.  To that end, private investors 
in an attempt to ensure their investment cost 
will be repaid by the end of the  30 year pe-
riod, they should ensure that stalls are occu-
pied by  individuals or groups of individuals 
who have the capacity to pay as much rent 
as possible. That implies that the kind of 
business and  merchandise cannot be the 
selling of  agricultural products  and other 
nonagricultural products from rural areas. 
Such a requirement, therefore eliminates tra-
ditional market tenants as viable tenants in 
the reconstructed market.    
Thirdly, the traditional tenants who 
have a traditional market traders’ union, as 
front organization (P3DKM) to represent 
and advocate for their rights and interests. 
Traditional market tenants would prefer a 
policy that did not reconstruct the market, 
but in case reconstruction was deemed im-
perative, then the implementation of the pro-
ject should have been Malang city govern-
ment, and not private investors. Thus, tradi-
tional market tenants though not opposed to 
the idea, expressed strong objection to the 
project plan and implementation scheme.  
Thus, while local government and city 
mayor was eager to showcase the recon-
struction of Dinoyo market cost effectively 
achieved as  proof of the performance of the 
government under his or her tenure, private  
investors focused on controlling the manage-
ment of the reconstructed public asset to ex-
pedite return in investment made based on 
the approved business plan. 
 Meanwhile, tenants if given the op-
portunity, would have preferred to maintain 
their traditional small   businesses in either 
the traditional market or the reconstructed 
market. To that end, using BOT as a form of 
public private partnership to develop public 
infrastructure while generates efficiency 
hence cost effective for the government, 
generates disadvantages for some of  the lo-
cal population who lose their rights to earn a 
living by paying affordable rent to local gov-
ernments. Consequently, BOT while in theo-
ry can be used as a model in procuring pub-
lic services, in practice, it has the potential to 
arouse public opposition against the local 
government and management under the co-
trol of the private investors. 
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CONCLUSION 
              The reconstruction of Dinoyo tra-
ditional market which was based on Minis-
ter of Trade regulation No. No 37/M-DAG/
PER/5/2017, and Minister of Trade regula-
tion No. 70/M-DAG/PER/12/2013 on revi-
talization of traditional markets and modern 
markets and Malang city Mayor Regulation 
No.  188.45/16/35.73.112/2010 has generat-
ed many benefits, which include among 
others, improving quality of sanitation and 
health, attractiveness of the market due to 
better organization, availability space for 
parking, improved security and safety for 
sellers and buyers.  
              Nonetheless, the project failed to 
achieve the principal goal of the policy of 
revitalizing traditional markets in Indonesia 
which was adopted since 1980s. The main 
objective is to enhance competitiveness of 
traditional market sellers with modern mar-
kets. Dinoyo revitalization, has led to loss 
of livelihood for many traditional market 
tenants because of the reluctance of man-
agement to allocate them stalls in the refur-
bished market, high rent paid for hiring 
stalls, leading to conflicts among the tradi-
tional market tenants, Malang city govern-
ment and private investors who are charged 
with managing Dinoyo modern market for 
30 years. The case of Dinoyo traditional 
market revitalization underscores a dilem-
ma that policy makers often face. Due to 
financial constraints  which is attributable 
to having many development priorities that 
need funding at the same time, local gov-
ernment have to choose public services  
which must be implemented directly by the 
various offices, and those that are delegated 
to the private sector through public private 
partnership arrangements.  
 Using BOT as a mechanism to fi-
nance public infrastructure facilities has be-
come increasingly common practice in the 
procurement of public goods especially 
those that require large investment cost. 
Some of the benefits include, the involve-
ment of non-state actors in  procurement, 
delivery  and management of public physi-
cal infrastructure, creates fiscal space for 
financing other equally important public  
goods and services,  and reduces the cost 
public sector should have to pay  for  civil 
servants  and administration units that pro-
duce  and manage such services.  
  Nonetheless, the adoption of BOT, 
like in the case of Dinoyo traditional mar-
ket, has the potential to create disputes be-
tween private investors who finance the re-
construction and future management of the 
refurbished facilities and former tenants of 
public facilities because the latter more of-
ten than not end up losing rights they had 
prior to coming into force of  new arrange-
ments. The case because the more compli-
cated if principles of good governance do 
not underpin project planning and imple-
mentation, making corruption, collusion 
and nepotism possible.   
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